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Underinsured Motorist Coverage Offsets: 
Plainly Stated or Inherently Ambiguous? 
Owners Ins. Co. v. Craig, 514 S.W.3d 614 (Mo. 2017) (en banc) 
Kevin Buchanan* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
While forty-nine states and the District of Columbia require a certain level 
of automobile liability insurance to legally drive a car, not every car on the road 
is actually insured.1  Furthermore, it is often the case that drivers cause acci-
dents that result in damages far exceeding the level of insurance they carry.2  
To address these concerns, insurance companies offer uninsured motorist 
(“UM”) coverage policies and underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage poli-
cies.3  However, purchasers of these policies frequently run into problems 
when the policy falls short of providing coverage for the loss they suffered. 
To illustrate, imagine that you purchase an insurance policy that provides 
UIM coverage with a limit of $500,000.  You are then involved in a car acci-
dent in which you suffer $1,000,000 in damages.  The at-fault driver also car-
ries an insurance policy with a limit of $500,000.  You would expect that the 
at-fault driver’s policy in addition to your UIM coverage would take care of all 
of your damages.  However, due to a short provision in your policy, your in-
surance company deducts the at-fault driver’s payment from what he has to pay 
you.  Therefore, your insurance company pays you $0, and you are left with 
$500,000 in uncompensated damages even though you were under the impres-
sion that the UIM coverage you paid for would protect you under these circum-
stances. 
The policy provision that insurance companies use to accomplish this de-
duction is called a “coverage offset.”  In most cases, courts have chosen not to 
enforce coverage offsets that deduct from the policy limit.  However, in Own-
ers Insurance Co. v. Craig, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, 
 
*B.A., New York University, 2015; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of 
Law, 2018; Note and Comment Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2017–2018.  I would like 
to extend a special thank you to Professor Robert Jerry and the entire Missouri Law 
Review staff for their support and guidance in writing this Note. 
 1. See Background on: Compulsory Auto/Uninsured Motorists, INS. INFO. INST. 
(Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.iii.org/article/background-on-compulsory-auto-uninsured-
motorists; see also infra Part III.B. 
 2. See infra Part III.B. 
 3. See infra Part III.B. 
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went a different direction by enforcing such an offset.4  In opposition to the 
previous decisions by the Missouri Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court 
of Missouri, the court found the offset provision of an insurance policy to be 
unambiguous and, therefore, enforceable.5  The case was then transferred by 
the Southern District to the Supreme Court of Missouri.6  The Supreme Court 
of Missouri agreed with the Southern District and enforced the offset.7 
Part II of this Note looks at the facts and holding of Craig.  Part III exam-
ines some of the main principles of insurance policy interpretation and the pur-
poses of uninsured and UIM coverage.  Part IV looks at the majority and dis-
senting opinions in Craig.  Finally, Part V argues in favor of the dissent and 
against the use of coverage offsets. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
Vicki Craig and Chris Craig were both named insureds on an automobile 
insurance policy issued by Owners Insurance Company (“Owners”).8  The ef-
fective dates of the policy were October 31, 2013, to October 31, 2014.9  The 
policy, which the Craigs paid the premiums for, provided UIM coverage.10  The 
policy limit for UIM coverage was $250,000 per person and $500,000 per oc-
currence.11  The “Coverage” provision of the UIM policy provided: 
We will pay compensatory damages, including but not limited to 
loss of consortium, that any insured is legally entitled to recover from 
the owner or operator of an underinsured automobile for bodily injury 
 
 4. Owners Ins. Co. v. Craig, No. SD 34053, 2016 WL 3964628, at *1 (Mo. Ct. 
App. July 19, 2016), transferred en banc to 514 S.W.3d 614 (Mo. 2017). 
 5. Id. at *6.   
 6. Owners, 2016 WL 3964628, at *9. 
 7. Owners, 514 S.W.3d at 615. 
 8. Owners, 2016 WL 3964628, at *2. 
 9. Brief of Appellant Owners Ins. Co. at *2, Owners, 2016 WL 3964628 (No. SD 
34053). 
 10. Owners, 2016 WL 3964628, at *2–3.  According to the “Definitions” provi-
sion of the policy, an “Underinsured automobile” means: 
 
b. . . . an automobile to which a bodily injury liability bond or liability in-
surance policy applies at the time of the occurrence: 
 
(1) with limits of liability at least equal to or greater than the limits re-
quired by the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law of Missouri; 
and 
 
(2) such limits of liability are less than those stated in the Declarations 
for [UIM] Coverage.  
 
Id. at *2 (emphasis added) (alteration in original). 
 11. Id. at *3. 
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sustained by an insured person while occupying an automobile that is 
covered by SECTION II – LIABILITY COVERAGE of the policy.12 
The policy contained a “Limit of Liability” section, which stated: 
a. The Limits of Liability stated in the Declarations for Underin-
sured Motorist Coverage are for reference purposes only. Under no cir-
cumstances do we have a duty to pay you or any person entitled to Un-
derinsured Motorist Coverage under this policy the entire Limits of Li-
ability stated in the Declarations for this coverage.13 
The next paragraph of the “Limit of Liability” section contained the offset lan-
guage, which stated: 
b. Subject to the Limits of Liability stated in the Declarations for Un-
derinsured Motorist Coverage and paragraph 4.a. above, our payment 
for Underinsured Motorist Coverage shall not exceed the lowest of: 
(1) the amount by which the Underinsured Motorist Coverage Lim-
its of Liability stated in the Declarations exceed the total limits of 
all bodily injury liability bonds and liability insurance policies avail-
able to the owner or operator of the underinsured automobile. 
(2) the amount by which compensatory damages, including but not 
limited to loss of consortium, because of bodily injury exceed the to-
tal limits of all bodily injury liability bonds and the liability insurance 
policies available to the owner or operator of the underinsured auto-
mobile.14 
On or about March 1, 2014, while stopped at a red light, Vicki Craig was in-
jured when the vehicle she was driving was struck by another vehicle driven 
by Tlir Hnin Thang.15  As a result of this incident, the Craigs incurred damages 
exceeding $300,000.16  Mr. Thang was insured by Shelter Insurance Com-
pany.17  Mr. Thang’s insurance policy had a per person bodily injury liability 
limit of $50,000, which was paid to the Craigs.18  This left the Craigs with over 
$250,000 in uncompensated damages.19 
 
 12. Id. at *2. 
 13. Brief of Appellant Owners Ins. Co., supra note 9, at *4. 
 14. Id. at *4–5. 
 15. Owners, 2016 WL 3964628, at *3. 
 16. Id.  The parties agreed that the Craigs’ damages exceeded $300,000.  Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
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On or about July 16, 2014, the Craigs made a demand for Owners to pay 
the $250,000 per person UIM limit under the policy, “which [the Craigs] as-
serted was the amount to which they were entitled under the Policy’s UIM cov-
erage provision.”20  The parties agreed that the damages caused by Ms. Craig’s 
accident exceeded the combined limits of Ms. Craig’s UIM coverage and Mr. 
Thang’s insurance policy.21  Therefore, in November 2014, Owners agreed to 
pay the Craigs $200,000, “representing the $250,000 per person UIM limit with 
a deduction of the $50,000 payment [the Craigs] received from Shelter on be-
half of Mr. Thang, and which all parties agree is owed under the terms of the 
[p]olicy.”22  Based upon a provision in the policy, Owners sought to take an 
offset from the UIM limits for the $50,000 paid by Mr. Thang’s policy.23  
Whether Owners owed the Craigs an additional $50,000 of UIM coverage un-
der the terms of the policy was disputed.24  The parties agreed that this issue 
should be decided by the trial court in a declaratory judgment action.25 
The trial court granted summary judgment in the Craigs’ favor, finding 
the policy “ambiguous in regard to the set-off issue” and “interpret[ing] the 
ambiguity in favor of [the] [i]nsureds.”26  The trial judge “found that the policy 
was ‘replete’ with references to the declarations page as the location of the 
various coverages and limits purchased by the insured.”27  Furthermore, the 
trial judge “noted that the declarations page had a place for explanation of cov-
erages, but chose not to identify anything in regard to the UIM limits set forth 
therein.”28  The trial court therefore awarded the disputed $50,000 to the 
Craigs.29  Owners subsequently appealed the trial court’s judgment.30 
On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, in an opin-
ion written by Judge Burrell and joined by Judge Lynch, reversed the trial 
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Craigs and remanded the 
matter.31  In doing so, the court held that the UIM limit and the offset provisions 
in the insurance policy were not ambiguous.32  The court concluded that when 
viewed as a whole, the policy language concerning the UIM limit and the offset 
was not ambiguous.33  While the declarations page of the policy lacked any 
caveat or disclaimer regarding UIM coverage, “it did not state that it was the 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Brief of Respondents Vicky Craig and Chris Craig at *2, Owners, 2016 WL 
3964628 (No. SD 34053). 
 22. Owners, 2016 WL 3964628, at *3. 
 23. Brief of Respondents Vicky Craig and Chris Craig, supra note 21, at *2. 
 24. Owners, 2016 WL 3964628, at *3. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Brief of Respondents Vicky Craig and Chris Craig, supra note 21, at *3. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Owners, 2016 WL 3964628, at *3. 
 31. Id. at *6.  
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
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sole expression of UIM coverage, and it referenced other forms, including the 
UIM endorsement.”34  The court determined that the UIM endorsement 
“plainly stated” that the UIM limit was for “reference purposes only” and that 
Owners did not have a duty to pay the entire UIM limit under any circum-
stances.35  Rather than pay the UIM limit, the court found that the policy lan-
guage unambiguously stated that Owners would provide “the lesser of (1) the 
amount paid on behalf of the operator of the underinsured vehicle subtracted 
from the UIM limit; or (2) the amount that the compensatory damages ex-
ceeded that paid on behalf of the operator of the underinsured vehicle would 
be Owners’ payment obligation.”36 
Furthermore, the court emphasized that the Supreme Court of Missouri 
has held that the declarations page of an insurance policy only states the pol-
icy’s essential terms in an abbreviated form.37  However, when reading the in-
surance policy as a whole, it becomes “clear that a reader must look elsewhere 
to determine the scope of coverage.”38 
The court further rejected the Craigs’ argument that offset provisions are 
precluded by the Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision in Manner v. 
Schiermeier based on the Southern District’s decision in Beshears v. Shelter 
Mutual Insurance Co.39  The court found that this argument interpreted Manner 
and Beshears too broadly.40  The court reasoned that, while other decisions 
regarding UIM coverage are instructive, “they are not dispositive in the ab-
sence of identical policy language.”41  The court followed Jones in enforcing 
an insurance policy according to its terms when finding the policy unambigu-
ous.42  Furthermore, the court agreed with the precedent in Warden v. Shelter 
Mutual Insurance Co. that “[a]n insurance contract may be written in such a 
way as to reduce the amount paid as damages under UIM coverage by subtract-
ing the at-fault driver’s contribution from the UIM limit instead of the total 
damages suffered.”43 
In the dissenting opinion, Judge Rahmeyer found the language of the in-
surance policy to be ambiguous.44  Judge Rahmeyer emphasized that “the in-
surance company did not advise the consumer that they will never receive what 
they purchased.”45  While Owners “offered an amount of coverage as shown 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. (quoting Floyd-Tunnell v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 439 S.W.3d 215, 221 (Mo. 
2014) (en banc)). 
 39. Id. at *4. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at *5 (quoting Long v. Shelter Ins. Cos., 351 S.W.3d 692, 702 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2011)). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at *9 (Rahmeyer, J., dissenting). 
 45. Id. 
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on the declaration page,” it “paid an entirely different amount.”46  The Craigs 
paid “for $250,000 per person/$500,000 per occurrence in underinsured mo-
torist coverage, not $250,000 minus the $50,000.”47  With the offset, “[t]he 
carrier will never pay the full amount on the declaration page when the negli-
gent driver is an insured driver because that driver has the statutory amount of 
liability insurance.”48  Although not necessary for her analysis of the ambiguity 
of the policy, Judge Rahmeyer further noted in a footnote that on its website, 
Owners purported to offer consumers UIM insurance to “[p]rotect[] you and 
your passengers from losses and damages suffered if injury is caused by the 
negligence of a driver who does not have enough insurance to pay for all losses 
and damages.”49  Therefore, “[t]he Craigs, as reasonable consumers, did not 
get what was promised.”50  Accordingly, Judge Rahmeyer concluded that the 
policy was ambiguous and the trial court did not err in finding the policy am-
biguous.51  Additionally, Judge Rahmeyer “certif[ied] that the majority opinion 
[was] contrary to a previous decision of an appellate court of this State and 
[therefore] transfer[ed] [the] case to the Supreme Court of Missouri pursuant 
to Rule 83.03, Missouri Court Rules (2016).”52  The Supreme Court of Mis-
souri agreed with the Southern District, again reversing the trial court’s judg-
ment and remanding.53 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Insurance Policy Interpretation 
Under the “plain meaning” rule of interpretation, absent any ambiguities, 
insurance policies are interpreted according to their plain meaning.54  A pol-
icy’s plain meaning “is the single meaning, if any, to which the language of the 
[policy] is reasonably susceptible when applied to the claim at issue, in the 
context of the insurance policy as a whole, without reference to extrinsic evi-
dence regarding the meaning of the term.”55  This is the rule unless the court 
concludes that “extrinsic evidence shows that a reasonable person in the poli-
cyholder’s position would give the term a different meaning.”56  Such a “mean-
ing must be more reasonable than the plain meaning in light of the extrinsic 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at *9 n.1. 
 50. Id. at *9. 
 51. Id. at *8–9. 
 52. Id. at *9. 
 53. Owners Ins. Co. v. Craig, 514 S.W.3d 614, 618 (Mo. 2017) (en banc). 
 54. See Mark A. Geistfeld, Interpreting the Rules of Insurance Contract Interpre-
tation, 68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 371, 375 (2015). 
 55. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 3(1) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Fi-
nal Draft 2017). 
 56. Id. § 3(2). 
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evidence, and it must be a meaning to which the language of the term is rea-
sonably susceptible.”57  In Missouri, “[w]hen interpreting the language of 
an insurance policy, [the court] gives a term its ordinary meaning, unless it 
plainly appears that a technical meaning was intended.”58 
Aside from the plain meaning rule, one of the most important principles 
of insurance law “is captured by the maxim contra proferentem, which directs 
that ambiguities in a contract be interpreted ‘against the drafter,’ who is almost 
always the insurer.”59  Of course, to apply contra proferentem, the language of 
an insurance policy must first be determined to be ambiguous.60  When the 
language is determined to be unambiguous, “an insurance policy must be en-
forced according to its terms.”61 
Courts find insurance policies to be ambiguous “when there is duplicity, 
indistinctness, or uncertainty in the meaning of the language in the policy.”62  
Furthermore, “[l]anguage is ambiguous if it is reasonably open to different con-
structions.”63  In accordance with contra proferentem, “when parties attach dif-
ferent meanings to a word or phrase, the meaning of the party with less reason 
to understand the other side’s meaning is to be preferred.”64 
The doctrine of reasonable expectations “can be a component of contra 
proferentem, entitling an insured to the coverage that she would reasonably 
expect when confronted by an ambiguous policy term.”65  In this way, the doc-
trine “is only a rule of interpretation: when two interpretations exist as to what 
an insured might expect a policy to mean, and one is inapt or absurd while the 
other is reasonable, the reasonable one is selected.”66  Alternatively, the doc-
trine of reasonable expectations “can function independently of contra 
proferentem by providing coverage in the face of unambiguous policy language 
to the contrary.”67 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Republic Ins. Co., 941 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Mo. 1997) 
(en banc). 
 59. Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. 
L. REV. 531, 531 (1996) (footnote omitted); see also Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life 
Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599, 602 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.) (“[I]nsurers who seek to impose 
upon words of common speech an esoteric significance intelligible only to their craft, 
must bear the burden of any resulting confusion.”). 
 60. Geistfeld, supra note 54, at 371. 
 61. Seeck v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 212 S.W.3d 129, 132 (Mo. 2007) (en banc). 
 62. Gulf Ins. Co. v. Noble Broad., 936 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Mo. 1997) (en banc); 
accord Krombach v. Mayflower Ins. Co., 827 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Mo. 1992) (en banc). 
 63. Gulf, 936 S.W.2d at 814; accord Krombach, 827 S.W.2d at 210. 
 64. ROBERT H. JERRY II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE 
LAW 135 (5th ed. 2012). 
 65. Geistfeld, supra note 54, at 371. 
 66. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 64, at 135. 
 67. Geistfeld, supra note 54, at 371. 
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There are three versions of the doctrine of reasonable expectations: the 
“whole transaction” version, the “fine print” version, and the “ambiguity” ver-
sion.68  Under the whole transaction version, courts “refus[e] to enforce the 
language of an insurance contract because doing so would frustrate the reason-
able expectations of coverage that the insurer created outside of the written 
contract.”69  Under the fine print version, courts “refus[e] to enforce the ‘fine 
print’ of an insurance contract because it limits a portion of the contract that is 
more prominent.”70  Under the ambiguity version, courts “constru[e] an alleg-
edly ambiguous term in favor of the insured in order to satisfy his reasonable 
expectations.”71  The ambiguity version is the most cautious version of the doc-
trine of reasonable expectations in that “[i]t is identical to the practice of con-
struing ambiguities against the insurer,” satisfying the reasonable expectations 
of insureds as “an additional justification for doing so.”72  Missouri is among 
the states that follow the ambiguity approach.73 
Additionally, courts have interpreted insurance coverage terms liberally 
and interpreted exclusions narrowly.74  Courts have also interpreted policy lan-
guage consistently with a layperson’s understanding.75  Furthermore, when 
possible, courts construe policies so as to achieve the purpose of providing “in-
demnity to the insured for the losses to which the insurance relates.”76  The 
Supreme Court of Missouri has held that “[t]he meaning of the terms of an 
insurance policy is ordinarily tested by the common understanding and speech 
of men.”77  When “there is a conflict between a technical definition and the 
meaning which would normally be understood by the average layman, the lay-
man’s definition will be applied unless it plainly appears that the technical 
meaning is intended.”78 
 
 68. Stephen J. Ware, Comment, A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doc-
trine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461, 1467 (1989). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 1468. 
 73. Id. at 1467 n.32; see also Lutsky v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., Inc., of Mo., 695 
S.W.2d 870, 874 (Mo. 1985) (en banc) (exemplifying the “ambiguity” approach). 
 74. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 64, at 136; James M. Fischer, Why Are Insur-
ance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpretation?: Text Versus Context, 24 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995, 1004 (1992). 
 75. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 64, at 136; Fischer, supra note 74, at 1004. 
 76. Fischer, supra note 74, at 1004–05; accord JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 
64, at 136. 
 77. Greer v. Zurich Ins. Co., 441 S.W.2d 15, 27 (Mo. 1969). 
 78. Id. 
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B.  Purposes of UM and UIM Coverage 
In the United States, the District of Columbia and every state, with the 
exception of New Hampshire, have compulsory liability insurance statutes “re-
quir[ing] drivers to have auto liability insurance before they can legally drive 
a motor vehicle.”79  However, these statutes have not been effective in signifi-
cantly reducing the number of uninsured drivers.80  In 1993, sixteen percent of 
motorists nationwide were uninsured.81  As of 2015, nearly thirteen percent of 
motorists are still uninsured.82  There are a number of reasons why these stat-
utes may be ineffective.83  “[S]ome drivers with surcharges for accidents or 
serious traffic violations do not want to pay the high premiums that result from 
a poor driving record.”84  For others, with the average annual automobile in-
surance premium being over $800,85  liability insurance is simply too expen-
sive.86  Additionally, there is difficulty in enforcing such statutes because 
“[w]ith the estimated percentage of uninsured drivers in the United States close 
to 13 percent, it is costly to track down violators of compulsory insurance 
laws.”87 
Furthermore, many insured motorists are often underinsured and do not 
carry enough insurance to cover the losses they may cause in an accident.88  
When an uninsured or underinsured motorist is involved in an accident, “the 
injured party’s only hope for recovery may depend on her own insurance pol-
icy.”89  To address such situations, many states, including Missouri,90 require 
motorists to purchase UM coverage.91  Other states require insurers to offer 
 
 79. Background on: Compulsory Auto/Uninsured Motorists, supra note 1. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Facts + Statistics: Auto Insurance, INS. INFO. INST., 
https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-auto-insurance (last visited Feb. 12, 
2018) (noting “[t]he countrywide average auto insurance expenditure rose 2.7 percent 
to $889.01 in 2015 from $865.34 in 2014”).  In 2015, the average auto insurance pre-
mium in Missouri was $745.04.  Id. 
 86. Background on: Compulsory Auto/Uninsured Motorists, supra note 1. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Stephen R. Bough & M. Blake Heath, Current Issues in Underinsured and 
Uninsured Insurance Coverage in Missouri, 68 J. MO. B. 208, 208 (2012). 
 89. Id. 
 90. MO.  REV. STAT.  § 379.203 (2016) (Missouri’s uninsured motorist statute). 
 91. See Background on: Compulsory Auto/Uninsured Motorists, supra note 1; see 
also ALAN I. WIDISS & JEFFREY E. THOMAS, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED 
MOTORIST INSURANCE § 1.11 (rev. 3d ed. 2017) (“Forty-nine states now have legisla-
tion in effect which establishes various types of requirements for this coverage, and it 
has become an integral part of automobile insurance policies throughout the United 
States.”). 
9
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UM coverage but do not require drivers to purchase it.92  UM coverage was 
developed in an attempt “to eliminate the problems presented by financially 
irresponsible motorists.”93  The rationale for UM coverage is “that the number 
of totally uncompensated injuries could be significantly reduced through . . . a 
. . . type of insurance that would indemnify purchasers for injuries caused by 
negligent uninsured motorists.”94  In doing so, UM coverage allows “a person 
injured by an uninsured motorist [to] be compensated by her own insurer in an 
amount equal to what the uninsured tortfeasor’s liability insurer would have 
paid if the tortfeasor had carried liability insurance.”95 
Furthermore, in addition to UM coverage, more than thirty states have 
enacted statutory requirements “that mandate underinsured motorist insurance 
which affords more extensive coverage than that required by both the original 
uninsured motorist insurance legislation and the statutes that required supple-
mentary uninsured motorist insurance.”96  UIM coverage “provide[s] addi-
tional coverage for those injured by a negligent motorist where that motorist’s 
liability coverage does not fully pay for the injured party’s actual damage.”97  
Rather than insuring a particular vehicle, UIM coverage “is floating insurance 
that follows the insured.”98  There are two main categories of UIM insurance 
statutes, although not all states have such statutes.99 
Under the “add-on” version of UIM insurance, the statute “makes the 
amount of the insured’s liability coverage an add-on to the amount of the tort-
feasor’s liability coverage if the tortfeasor’s coverage is inadequate to reim-
burse the insured’s loss.”100  In other words, the add-on version acts to indem-
nify “accident victims up to the applicable coverage limits for damages that are 
 
 92. See Background on: Compulsory Auto/Uninsured Motorists, supra note 1. 
 93. WIDISS & THOMAS, supra note 91, § 1.1. 
 94. Id. 
 95. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 64, at 959.  “Generally the coverage pays for 
personal injury but not property damage.”  Id. 
 96. WIDISS & THOMAS, supra note 91, § 31.5  (“Underinsured motorist insurance 
was developed to address (1) the inadequacies of uninsured motorist insurance . . . and 
(2) the shortcomings of higher limit uninsured motorist insurance that only applied to 
accidents caused by uninsured motorists.”); see also JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 
64, at 959.  Missouri has not mandated UIM insurance.  See MO. REV. STAT. § 379.204 
(2016). 
 97. Bough & Heath, supra note 88, at 210; see also Hopkins v. Am. Econ. Ins. 
Co., 896 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Geneser v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 787 S.W.2d 288, 289 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)) (“Underinsured coverage is 
optional from a person’s own motorist carrier and pays for losses incurred because an-
other negligent motorist’s coverage is insufficient to pay for the injured person’s actual 
losses.”). 
 98. Bough & Heath, supra note 88, at 210. 
 99. See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 64, at 967; WIDISS & THOMAS, supra 
note 91, § 32.2. 
 100. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 64, at 967; see also WIDISS & THOMAS, supra 
note 91, § 32.2 (“In many states, the statutory mandate is for coverage that will provide 
10
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not compensated by the tortfeasor’s insurance.”101  This kind of UIM coverage 
is typically broader and offers more coverage than the other version of UIM 
coverage, the “topping-off” version, because it “focuses . . . on providing re-
sources to compensate the injured victim.”102  Therefore, it is typically more 
expensive than the topping-off version.103  New Mexico’s UIM insurance stat-
ute, which mandates UIM insurance along with UM insurance,104 follows the 
add-on approach.105  In considering the state’s UIM statute, the Supreme Court 
of New Mexico noted “that in expanding uninsured motorist coverage to in-
clude underinsured motorist coverage, the Legislature manifested the intent to 
compensate the innocent victims of inadequately insured drivers.”106 
Under the topping-off version of UIM statutes, “if the injured person pos-
sessed liability insurance in excess of the liability insurance carried by the tort-
feasor, and if the injured person’s loss exceeds the limits of the tortfeasor’s 
coverage, the injured person’s own insurance picks up the difference.”107  In 
other words, the topping-off version puts the injured person in the position he 
or she would have been in “if the underinsured motorist had liability insurance 
with limits of liability equal to those of the applicable underinsured motorist 
insurance.”108 
With topping-off coverage, insurers are able to “cap the UIM recovery at 
. . . what the insured would recover if the tortfeasor had no insurance.”109  This 
is done through an offset that the insurer “gets for any amounts paid by the 
tortfeasor or the tortfeasor’s liability insurer to the insured-victim.”110  While 
some states expressly authorize such offsets, “in the absence of such statutory 
authorization, the [offset] provisions are typically held to be invalid.”111  This 
is because of policy “stacking,” which “is the ability of the insured to collect 
insurance coverage from multiple insurance policies.”112  In Missouri, “where 
multiple policies or multiple uninsured motorist coverages are in place, insur-
ers are prohibited from including policy language precluding stacking of the 
coverage provided under multiple policies or coverage provisions.”113  How-
 
compensation whenever the liability insurance available from the tortfeasor is not suf-
ficient to provide complete indemnification for the injuries sustained by the insured.”). 
 101. WIDISS & THOMAS, supra note 91, § 32.2. 
 102. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 64, at 967. 
 103. Id. 
 104. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-301 (West 2018). 
 105. WIDISS & THOMAS, supra note 91, § 32.2. 
 106. Konnick v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 703 P.2d 889, 891 (N.M. 1985). 
 107. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 64, at 967. 
 108. WIDISS & THOMAS, supra note 91, § 32.2. 
 109. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 64, at 967. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Bough & Heath, supra note 88, at 209. 
 113. Ritchie v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 307 S.W.3d 132, 135 (Mo. 2009) (en 
banc). 
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ever, in the context of UIM policy stacking, “if the policy language is unam-
biguous in disallowing stacking, the anti-stacking provisions are enforceable” 
because UIM coverage is not mandated in Missouri.114  Therefore, “the exist-
ence of the [underinsured motorist] coverage and its ability to be stacked are 
determined by the contract entered between the insured and the insurer.”115 
Section 379.204 of the Missouri Revised Statutes pertains to the construc-
tion of UIM coverage policies.116  This is the only Missouri statute that explic-
itly pertains to UIM coverage.117  Passed in 1999, the statute “effectively set[s] 
the minimum amount of UIM coverage capable of being marketed and sold at 
$50,000.”118  In doing so, the statute acts to prevent insurance companies from 
selling policies that will never provide any coverage because in order for UIM 
coverage to apply, the at-fault motorist will have at least $25,000 in cover-
age.119  This effectively requires UIM coverage to act as an add-on when the 
policy limit is less than $25,000.  However, it mandates neither UIM insurance 
nor the offer of UIM insurance. 
Furthermore, Missouri does not have any statutory requirements for UIM 
coverage in regard to stacking and offsets.120  Nor does Missouri’s UIM statute 
require the add-on approach or the topping-off approach.  As a result of Mis-
souri lacking a statutory requirement, UIM coverage is subject to differing re-
sults on offsets depending on the language of the policy – specifically, to what 
extent the insurer has drafted it unambiguously to require an offset – “and the 
ability to convince the court of its similarity to the policy language in prior 
decisions or the ability to distinguish it.”121  Offset provisions “that deduct from 
coverage limits rather than from total damages are permissible when plain and 
unambiguous language is used.”122 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rodriguez v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of 
Am., 808 S.W.2d 379, 383 (Mo. 1991) (en banc)). 
 116. MO.  REV. STAT.  § 379.204 (2016) (“Any underinsured motor vehicle cover-
age with limits of liability less than two times the limits for bodily injury or death pur-
suant to section 303.020 shall be construed to provide coverage in excess of the liability 
coverage of any underinsured motor vehicle involved in the accident.”).  MO.  REV. 
STAT.  § 303.020 sets the minimum required motorist insurance limit at $25,000.  MO.  
REV. STAT.  § 303.020(10) (2016). 
 117. David W. Reynolds, Comment, Modernizing Underinsured Motorist Cover-
age in Missouri: Removing the Insurance Paradox Between Uninsured and Underin-
sured Coverage Via Legislative Action, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1049, 1067 (2013). 
 118. Id. 
 119. See Miller v. Ho Kun Yun, 400 S.W.3d 779, 791 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (“Con-
fusion of the ordinary insurance purchaser of UIM coverage is legislatively recognized 
in Missouri, in that the Missouri General Assembly has adopted legislation to help pro-
tect the insurance consumer from purchasing ‘illusory’ coverage.”). 
 120. See Bough & Heath, supra note 88, at 210; see also Ritchie, 307 S.W.3d at 
135 (“[U]nlike many other states, Missouri statutes do not . . . mandate [UM] cover-
age.”). 
 121. Bough & Heath, supra note 88, at 215. 
 122. Id. at 212. 
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The Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, has expressed disdain 
for such provisions, holding in Miller v. Ho Kun Yun that unless “advised prior 
to purchase [of] exactly how under insured motorist coverage works, the policy 
holder may assume that it operates in a manner similar to un insured motorist 
coverage.”123  In other words, policy holders may assume that UIM coverage 
acts as an add-on and “compensates bodily injury above and beyond anything 
received from the tortfeasor.”124 
C.  Past Precedent Regarding UIM Coverage in Missouri 
The Supreme Court of Missouri has been relatively consistent in not al-
lowing insurers to offset UIM coverage in cases where the language of the pol-
icy was unclear or capable of being interpreted as ambiguous. 
In 2009, the Supreme Court of Missouri addressed UIM insurance offsets 
in Jones v. Mid-Century Insurance Co.125  In Jones, two plaintiff insureds sued 
their insurer seeking $100,000 in UIM coverage under their insurance pol-
icy.126  Although the trial court ruled that they were each entitled to only 
 
 123. Miller, 400 S.W.3d at 790. 
 124. Id. at 790–91. 
 125. Jones v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 287 S.W.3d 687, 690–91 (Mo. 2009) (en banc). 
 126. Id. at 689.  The “Limits of Liability” section of the policy in question stated in 
part: 
 
a. Our liability under the UNDERinsured Motorist Coverage cannot exceed 
the limits of UNDERinsured Motorist Coverage stated in the policy, and the 
most we will pay will be the lesser of: 
 
1. The difference between the amount of an insured person’s damages for 
bodily injury, and the amount paid to that insured person by or for any person 
or organization who is or may be held legally liable for the bodily injury; or 
 
2. The limits of liability of this coverage 
 
b. Subject to subsections a. and c.–h. in this Limits of Liability section, we 
will pay up to the limits of liability shown in the schedule below as shown in the 
Declarations. 
 
Id. at 690.  The “Limits of Liability” section further stated: 
 
f. The amount of UNDERinsured Motorist Coverage we will pay shall be 
reduced by any amount paid or payable to or for an insured person; 
 
i. by or for any person or organization who is or may held legally liable 
for the bodily injury to an insured person; or 
 
ii. for bodily injury under the liability coverage of this policy . . . . 
 
Id.  The insurer argued that this subsection allowed for a reduction of the coverage.  Id. 
at 691. 
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$50,000 due to an offset from the plaintiffs’ recovery from the tortfeasor, the 
Supreme Court of Missouri reversed, finding that the offset provision was am-
biguous.127  In doing so, the court found that even though one provision of the 
policy could be read to permit the offset, “two other provisions of the policy 
state[d] that coverage [would] be provided up to the full amount of the pol-
icy.”128  The court emphasized that “Missouri law is well-settled that where 
one provision of a policy appears to grant coverage and another to take it away, 
an ambiguity exists that will be resolved in favor of coverage.”129  Furthermore, 
“[t]his is particularly true where, as here, Mid-Century’s interpretation of the 
policy language would mean that it never actually would be required to pay its 
insureds the full amount of underinsured motorist coverage its policy ostensi-
bly provides.”130  The court noted that in order for Mid-Century’s interpretation 
of the policy to be unambiguous, the term “[t]he limits of liability of this cov-
erage” would need to be rewritten as “[t]he limits of liability of this coverage 
minus the amount already paid to that insured person.”131  However, the court 
emphasized that it “does not rewrite insurance policies to add language.”132 
In Ritchie v. Allied Property & Casualty Insurance Co., another 2009 
case, the Supreme Court of Missouri found that Allied, the insurer, was not 
entitled to an offset of the amount Ritchie, the insured, had collected from the 
tortfeasors.133  Ritchie suffered $1,800,000 in damages resulting from a car ac-
cident.134  Ritchie had a UIM coverage policy with a limit of $300,000 per 
accident.135  Ritchie’s policy contained a “Limit of Liability” provision, which 
read: 
A. The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for each person for 
Underinsured Motorists coverage is our maximum limit of liability for 
all damages . . . for care, loss of services, or death arising out of ‘bodily 
injury’ sustained by any one person in any one accident. Subject to this 
limit for each person, the limit of liability shown in the Schedule or in 
the Declarations for each accident for Underinsured Motorists Cover-
age is our maximum limit [of liability] for all damages for ‘bodily in-
jury’ [resulting] from any one accident.  This is the most we will pay 
regardless of the number of: 
1. “Insureds;” 
 
 127. Id. at 689. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 690–91. 
 132. Id. at 691. 
 133. See Ritchie v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 307 S.W.3d 132, 139–41 (Mo. 
2009) (en banc). 
 134. Id. at 134. 
 135. Id. 
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2. Claims made; 
3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or 
4. Vehicles involved in the accident.  
B. The limit of liability shall be reduced by all sums: 
1. Paid because of ‘bodily injury’ or by or on behalf of persons or 
organizations who may be legally responsible.  This includes all 
sums paid under Part A of this policy . . . .136 
Ritchie was only able to recover $60,000 from the at-fault drivers.137  The court 
ruled that Allied was obligated to pay the full $300,000.138 
The court provided an illustration of when Allied would be entitled to an 
offset: “[I]f the Ritchies had suffered only $140,000 in damages and had re-
covered $60,000 from other tortfeasors, then the $60,000 would be deducted 
from the total damages, and Allied would be responsible for only the remaining 
$80,000, thereby avoiding a double recovery.”139  However, Ritchie had 
$1,740,000 in unsatisfied damages – far more than the policy limits.140  In such 
cases, offset provisions do not apply unless they “plainly state[] that the amount 
payable in UIM coverage is the difference between the policy limits and the 
amount recovered from the tortfeasor.”141 
In 2013, the Supreme Court of Missouri again addressed the issue in Man-
ner v. Schiermeier.142  In Manner, the plaintiff insured sued the defendant in-
surers, claiming he was entitled to $400,000 in UIM coverage under four poli-
cies he held with the insurers.143  The plaintiff held one policy for the motor-
cycle he was riding at the time of his accident.144  He held two more policies 
on two trucks he owned – one policy for each truck.145  Additionally, he sought 
recovery on a fourth policy his father had on a motorcycle.146  All four of the 
policies contained a “Limits of Liability” provision that read: 
 
 136. Substitute Brief of Appellants at *9–10, Ritchie, 307 S.W.3d 132 (No. SC 
90085). 
 137. Ritchie, 307 S.W.3d at 134–35. 
 138. Id. at 141. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Bough & Heath, supra note 88, at 213. 
 142. See Manner v. Schiermeier, 393 S.W.3d 58, 62 (Mo. 2013) (en banc). 
 143. Id. at 60. 
 144. Id. at 60–61. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 61. 
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The limits of liability of this coverage as shown in the declarations 
apply, subject to the following: 
1. The limit for each person is the maximum for all damages sus-
tained by all persons as the result of bodily injury to one person in 
any one accident. 
2. Subject to the limit for each person, the limit for each accident is 
the maximum for bodily injury sustained by two or more persons in 
any one accident. 
We will pay no more than these maximums no matter how many ve-
hicles are described in the declarations, insured persons, claims, claim-
ants or policies or vehicles are involved in the accident. 
The limits of liability of this coverage will be reduced by: 
1. A payment made or amount payable by or on behalf of any per-
son or organization which may be legally liable, or under any collect-
ible auto liability insurance, for loss caused by an accident with an un-
derinsured motor vehicle . . . .147 
The trial court held that “owned-vehicle exclusions” in the policies unambigu-
ously applied to the motorcycle that the plaintiff was riding at the time of his 
accident.148  The owned-vehicle exclusion stated: “This coverage does not ap-
ply for bodily injury to a person: . . . While occupying, or when struck by, a 
motor vehicle that is not insured under this policy if it is owned by you or any 
resident of your household.”149  The term “owned” was not defined by the in-
surer.150  The insurers argued that the plaintiff “owned the [motorcycle] and 
that, because it was insured under a different policy than the ones insuring the 
other three vehicles, [the] owned-vehicle exclusion precluded coverage.”151  
The trial court agreed with the insurers and held that this exclusion precluded 
UIM coverage.152 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and remanded, hold-
ing that “[t]he burden was on the insurers to prove that the owned-vehicle ex-
clusion applied, which they failed to do.”153  The court further held that the 
plaintiff could stack his four UIM coverages and “because his unrecovered 
damages exceed[ed] the total liability limits of the stacked policies, the insurers 
[were] not entitled to offset the amount recovered from other tortfeasors against 
 
 147. Brief of Appellant at *3–4, Manner, 393 S.W.3d 58 (No. SC 92408). 
 148. Manner, 393 S.W.3d at 60. 
 149. Id. at 61. 
 150. Id. at 60. 
 151. Id. at 61. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 60. 
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those liability limits.”154  In determining that such offsets are not permitted, the 
court emphasized that “[t]he policy promises to pay the listed limits of liability, 
not simply the listed limits of liability reduced by the amount paid by the tort-
feasor.”155  Allowing an offset “would permit the policy to promise to pay the 
full limits of liability and yet [those] limits never would be paid as the amount 
of liability promised always would be reduced by the recovery from the other 
driver.”156  In a footnote, the court further explained: 
This is because, if the amount recoverable under the insurance policy 
always is reduced by the amount collected by the tortfeasor, an insured 
never could recover the entire liability limit set out in the underinsured 
motorist endorsement because, by definition, an underinsured motorist 
is someone who paid something toward the insured’s damages, alt-
hough not enough to satisfy those damages nor enough to exceed the 
insured’s underinsured motorist limits.157 
Missouri courts have further reached inconsistent results when considering 
identical offset provisions.  Prior to the Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision 
in Manner, in Lynch v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Co., the Southern District 
allowed an insurer to take an offset from coverage limits because the offset 
provision was “plain and unequivocal.”158  The offset provision in Lynch, titled 
“Limit of Our Liability,” read: 
The limit of liability for this Coverage will be the limit of liability 
stated for this particular endorsement number in the Declarations, sub-
ject to the following limitations: . . . 
(2) The limit of liability stated in the Declarations will be reduced 
by all amounts paid or payable to the insured making the claim by, or 
on behalf of, all persons legally obligated to pay any portion of the dam-
ages to that insured . . . 
(5) Regardless of the number of: 
(a) vehicles involved in the accident, 
(b) persons insured, 
(c) claims made, or 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 66. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 66 n.8. 
 158. Lynch v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 325 S.W.3d 531, 539 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). 
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(d) premiums paid, 
the limits for this Coverage may not be added to, combined with, or 
stacked onto the limits of other underinsured motorists coverage to de-
termine the total limit of underinsured motorists coverage available to 
any insured for any one accident.159 
In Shelter Mutual Insurance Co. v. Straw, the Southern District followed Lynch 
in enforcing an offset provision.160  In Straw, the insured, Straw, suffered dam-
ages equaling or exceeding $200,000 and had an insurance policy through 
Shelter with a UIM coverage limit of $100,000.161  Straw received the 
$100,000 policy limit from the tortfeasor.162  However, the court held that be-
cause the offset provision was unambiguous, Shelter did not have to pay Straw 
anything.163  Conversely, in Long v. Shelter Insurance Cos., the Western Dis-
trict found an offset provision, which was identical to that in Straw, to be am-
biguous and, thus, not enforceable.164 
 
 159. Id. at 534. 
 160. See Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Straw, 334 S.W.3d 592, 595–97 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2011). 
 161. Id. at 594.   The “Limits of Our Liability” provision in the policy enabling the 
offset read: 
 
(4) The limits are reduced by the amount paid, or payable, to the in-
sured for damages by, or for, any person who: 
 
(a) is legally liable for the bodily injury to that insured; or 
 
(b) may be held legally liable for the bodily injury to that insured. 
 
Id. at 595. 
 162. Id. at 594. 
 163. Id. at 596–98. 
 164. See Long v. Shelter Ins. Cos., 351 S.W.3d 692, 705 & n.16 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2011).  The “Limits of Our Liability” provision read: 
 
The limits of liability for this coverage are stated in the Declarations and are 
subject to the following limitations: . . . 
 
(4) The limits are reduced by the amount paid, or payable, to the in-
sured for damages by, or for, any person who: 
 
(a) is legally liable for the bodily injury to that insured; or 
  
(b) may be held legally liable for the bodily injury to that insured. 
 
Id. at 702. 
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In 2015, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, addressed the 
issue of UIM offsets in Beshears v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Co.165  In 
Beshears, the insurer, Shelter, claimed it was entitled to an offset “to reduce its 
limit of liability by the $100,000 recovered from the tortfeasor’s insurer.”166  
John Beshears was injured and his wife, Sue Ellen Beshears, died when the car 
John was driving was hit by a car driven by the tortfeasor.167  The tortfeasor 
had an insurance policy with limits of $50,000 per person and $100,000 per 
accident.168  The policy limit, $100,000, was paid to John as part of a settle-
ment.169  Thereafter, John “made a claim against Shelter for UIM coverage.”170 
The Beshears held a policy with Shelter that had limits of $250,000 per 
person and $500,000 per accident.171  Shelter and the Beshears stipulated that 
damages arising from the accident exceeded $600,000.172  “Shelter paid 
$200,000 to John for his personal injury claim and $200,000 to John for Sue 
Ellen’s wrongful death claim.”173  “Shelter determined that $400,000 figure by 
reducing the stated $500,000 per accident limit to account for the $100,000 
paid to John by” the tortfeasor’s insurer.174  Shelter argued that the policy au-
thorized this offset.175  The language, which Shelter claimed this authorization 
came from, read: 
The limits of liability for this coverage are stated in the Declarations 
and are subject to the following limitations: . . . 
(4) The limits are reduced by the amount paid, or payable, to the 
insured for damages by, or for, all persons who: 
 (a) are legally liable for the bodily injury to that insured; or 
 (b) may be held legally liable for the bodily injury to that in-
sured.176 
 
 165. See Beshears v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 468 S.W.3d 408, 409 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2015). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 410. 
 171. Id. at 409. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 410. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
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Relying on Manner, the court found that Shelter was not entitled to such an 
offset due to an “inherent ambiguity” in the language of the policy that permit-
ted a promise to pay the full limits of liability but did not actually require pay-
ing those limits.177 
In 2017, the Supreme Court of Missouri again addressed UIM coverage 
offsets in the instant case, Owners Insurance Co. v. Craig, in which the court 
reached a different result. 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In the instant case, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the trial 
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Craigs and remanded the 
matter.178  In an opinion written by Judge Fisher, the court held that the UIM 
limit and the offset provisions in the insurance policy were not ambiguous.179  
Judge Draper dissented in a separate opinion, finding the policy ambiguous.180 
A.  Majority 
The court concluded that, when viewed as a whole, the policy language 
concerning the UIM limit and the offset was not ambiguous.181 
The court found that, while “the declarations’ listed limit amount and 
other portions of the policy make bare, general references to the declarations 
containing the limit of liability,” the policy was unambiguous because “the 
declarations ‘are introductory only and subject to refinement and definition in 
the body of the policy.’”182  The court pointed out that the declarations page 
does not grant coverage but rather states “the policy’s essential terms in an 
abbreviated form, and when the policy is read as a whole, it is clear that a reader 
must look elsewhere to determine the scope of coverage.”183 
Citing Manner, Ritchie, and Jones,184 the court noted that “an ambiguity 
exists when the policy contains both: (1) express language indicating the in-
surer will indeed pay up to the declarations’ listed limit amount; and (2) offset 
provisions ensuring the insurer will never be obligated to pay such amount.”185  
These two elements together create an ambiguity because “both statements 
cannot be true; either the insurer will sometimes pay up to the declarations 
 
 177. Id. at 412. 
 178. Owners Ins. Co. v. Craig, 514 S.W.3d 614, 615 (Mo. 2017) (en banc). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 618 (Draper, J., dissenting). 
 181. Id. (majority opinion). 
 182. Id. at 617 (quoting Peters v. Farmers Ins. Co., 726 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Mo. 1987) 
(en banc)). 
 183. Id. (quoting Floyd-Tunnell v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 439 S.W.3d 215, 221 (Mo. 
2014) (en banc)). 
 184. See supra Part III.C. 
 185. Craig, 514 S.W.3d at 617.  
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listed limit, or the amount it will pay always will be limited by the amount paid 
by the underinsured motorist.”186  Considering the Craigs’ policy, the court 
determined that “no such internal inconsistency or contradiction” existed.187  
The court reasoned that, “unlike in cases such as Jones, the [Craigs’] policy 
contains no express language indicating the insurer will pay up to the declara-
tions’ listed limit amount.”188  The court further noted that the “Limits of Lia-
bility” section of the Craigs’ UIM policy stated that the declarations page “is 
‘for reference purposes only’ and ‘[u]nder no circumstances’ will Owners have 
a duty to pay that entire amount.”189  Therefore, the court determined that the 
Craigs’ policy takes the form of a policy that the Supreme Court of Missouri 
had previously found enforceable in Ritchie.190 
B.  Dissent 
In the dissenting opinion, while agreeing with the majority’s opinion 
holding that insurance companies may issue policies with offset clauses, Judge 
Draper found that the Craigs’ policy contained ambiguous provisions.191  Judge 
Draper emphasized that the offset provision in the Craigs’ policy “under any 
possible circumstance prevents [i]nsured from recovering the full amount of 
the UIM policy limits.”192  Unlike the offset provision “used to prevent double 
recovery” in Jones, Judge Draper found that the majority opinion “read the 
[offset] provision in Owners’ policy in isolation and failed to look at all of the 
provisions used in the UIM coverage policy.”193  Judge Draper noted that, 
“[w]hile the ‘[limit of liability]’ provision seeks to set off any amount of re-
covery from the policy limits stated on the declarations page, the ‘[other insur-
ance]’ provision clearly states that any coverage Owners provides is in excess 
of recovery from any other insurance provider.”194  This language allows 
“Owners to set off any recovered amount from [i]nsured’s policy limits.”195  
Therefore, the insured “will never recover the full amount of the stated liability 
limits because there will always be some recovery from an underinsured mo-
torist,” even though “the policy clearly provides that Owners’ coverage is in 
excess of any other insurance.”196  Judge Draper further pointed out that “[t]he 
‘reasonable expectation of an insurance buyer is to purchase protection against 
 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. (alteration in original). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 618 (Draper, J., dissenting). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 619. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
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large losses, and cover when the other driver’s insurance does not satisfy those 
losses.’”197 
Judge Draper reasoned that the Craigs “chose to pay for $250,000 per 
person and $500,000 per occurrence in UIM coverage, not $250,000 minus the 
amount recovered from the underinsured driver who caused more damage than 
the driver was insured to pay.”198  Therefore, Judge Draper concluded that 
“[b]ecause Owners’ policy appears in one section to provide any underinsur-
ance coverage in excess of other coverage and another section prevents the full 
recovery of the declared policy limits without exception, there is an ambigu-
ity.”199 
V.  COMMENT 
A. Ambiguity in UIM Offset Provisions 
In finding the offset provision policy language to be unambiguous, the 
Supreme Court of Missouri diverted from the past precedent of Missouri 
courts, which routinely found offset provisions to be ambiguous.  By doing so, 
the Supreme Court of Missouri attempted to move Missouri into the group of 
states that allow offsets. 
Admittedly, the Craigs’ policy with Owners was quite clear in regard to 
the offset.200  It stated that the UIM limit was for reference purposes only.201  
The Supreme Court of Missouri emphasized that “[w]hile the Craigs point to 
the declarations’ listed limit amount and other portions of the policy that make 
bare, general references to the declarations containing the limit of liability, the 
declarations ‘are introductory only and subject to refinement and definition in 
the body of the policy.’”202  Additionally, it stated what Owners would pay, 
which was described in the majority decision of the Southern District as “the 
lesser of (1) the amount paid on behalf of the operator of the underinsured 
vehicle subtracted from the UIM limit; or (2) the amount that the compensatory 
damages exceeded that paid on behalf of the operator of the underinsured ve-
hicle would be Owners’ payment obligation.”203  Furthermore, the offset pro-
vision here is far more detailed than that in Beshears, which did not state that 
 
 197. Id. (quoting Zemelman v. Equity Mut. Ins. Co., 935 S.W.2d 673, 679 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1996)). 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 617 (majority opinion). 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. (quoting Peters v. Farmers Ins. Co., 726 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Mo. 1987) (en 
banc)). 
 203. Owners Ins. Co. v. Craig, No. SD 34053, 2016 WL 3964628, at *6 (Mo. Ct. 
App. July 19, 2016), transferred en banc to 514 S.W.3d 614 (Mo. 2017). 
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the UIM limit was for reference purposes only.204  Moreover, the offset provi-
sion in Beshears did not state that the insurer had no duty to pay the policy 
limit under any circumstances.205  Read on its own, it is difficult to argue that 
the offset provision found in the Craigs’ policy was ambiguous. 
However, while the court adhered to the plain meaning of the policy, an 
argument could certainly be raised as to the offset provision not being plainly 
stated.  This is a case in which “extrinsic evidence shows that a reasonable 
person in the policyholder’s position would give the term a different meaning,” 
due to the way in which Owners’ website marketed UIM insurance.206  Alt-
hough some courts may preclude considering extrinsic evidence under the pa-
rol evidence rule, Owners’ website advertised UIM insurance as coverage 
when an underinsured tortfeasor “does not have enough insurance to pay for 
all losses and damages.”207  After seeing such an advertisement, reasonable 
purchasers would assume that the coverage they are buying will cover all losses 
and damages up to the limits of the full UIM policy limit, not just up to the 
difference between the UIM policy limit and the tortfeasor’s policy limit.  In 
jurisdictions following the whole transaction version of the doctrine of reason-
able expectations, this extrinsic evidence would certainly be enough to frustrate 
the reasonable expectations of the coverage, and the court would not enforce 
the language of the policy.208  Even in a jurisdiction that follows the ambiguity 
version of the doctrine of reasonable expectations, such as Missouri, the web-
site would likely be found ambiguous.209  Owners purports to offer one thing 
but, in fact, provides another.  This should be sufficient to overcome the pre-
sumption in favor of the plain meaning.210 
Furthermore, as noted in Judge Rahmeyer’s dissent, insurance policies 
should be evaluated as a whole, and when done so here, additional ambiguity 
is created.211  Regarding the language of the declarations page, Judge 
Rahmeyer quoted the Western District in Miller v. Ho Kun Yun: 
The law is also concerned with what an ordinary purchaser of insurance 
would be caused to believe about the coverage from review of the policy 
upon initial receipt of the policy, before an injury has occurred, while 
 
 204. See Beshears v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 468 S.W.3d 408, 410 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2015). 
 205. See id. 
 206. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS., supra note 55, § 3(2); Craig, 2016 
WL 3964628, at *9 n.1 (Rahmeyer, J., dissenting). 
 207. Craig, 2016 WL 3964628, at *9 n.1 (emphasis added). 
 208. See Ware, supra note 68, at 1467. 
 209. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 64, at 127. (“Sometimes . . . extrinsic infor-
mation is inconsistent with or contradicts the written terms of the policy, thereby cre-
ating an ambiguity that must be resolved through techniques of interpretation.”); see 
also Ware, supra note 68, at 1467. 
 210. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS., supra note 55, § 3(2). 
 211. Craig, 2016 WL 3964628, at *6; see also Manner v. Schiermeier, 393 S.W.3d 
58, 65 (Mo. 2013) (en banc). 
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there remains time to adjust coverages in light of his or her understand-
ing of the policy contents.212 
When the ordinary purchaser receives his insurance policy, he will normally 
read the declarations page to ensure that he is getting the coverage that he 
wants.213  He will not necessarily read much more of the policy.214  Therefore, 
the language of the declarations page is essential to determining the expecta-
tions of the insured.215 
Additionally, within the Craigs’ policy, ambiguity does not come solely 
from the language of the offset provision.  Rather, it comes from the conflict 
created when the policy promises “on the declaration page to provide the con-
sumer with a certain amount of underinsured motorist coverage and then 
take[s] it away in the fine print of the multi-page insurance policy.”216  This is 
a duplicity in the policy that leaves the meaning of the policy uncertain.217 
As noted in Judge Draper’s dissent, this is an inherent ambiguity because 
the policy claims to offer up to $250,000 but will never actually pay $250,000 
because every underinsured motorist will have at least $25,000 in coverage.218  
Such a determination is consistent with the Supreme Court of Missouri’s deci-
sion in Manner and the Southern District in Beshears.219  The language of the 
offset provision in the Craigs’ policy allowed Owners to collect premiums from 
the Craigs based on a UIM coverage limit of $500,000 per occurrence.220  Own-
ers could argue that this premium accounts for the offset and a policy without 
the offset would require a higher premium.  However, the ordinary consumer 
is unlikely to know how insurance premiums are calculated. 
Even though the policy stated that “[u]nder no circumstances do[es] 
[Owners] have a duty to pay” the entire policy limit,221 when paying premiums 
for such coverage, a reasonable insured would expect to receive that entire pol-
icy limit when his uncompensated damages exceed $250,000.  With damages 
exceeding $300,000 from an accident caused by an underinsured motorist, the 
Craigs recovered Mr. Thang’s policy limit of $50,000.  It is reasonable for the 
Craigs to expect that with $250,000 in uncompensated damages, they could 
collect the same amount from the policy they bought for just that occasion. 
 
 212. Craig, 2016 WL 3964628, at *8 (quoting Miller v. Ho Kun Yun, 400 S.W.3d 
779, 791 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013)). 
 213. Id. (quoting Miller, 400 S.W.3d at 791). 
 214. Id. (quoting Miller, 400 S.W.3d at 791). 
 215. Id. (quoting Miller, 400 S.W.3d at 791). 
 216. Id. 
 217. See Gulf Ins. Co. v. Noble Broad., 936 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Mo. 1997) (en banc); 
Krombach v. Mayflower Ins. Co., 827 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Mo. 1992) (en banc). 
 218. Owners Ins. Co. v. Craig, 514 S.W.3d 614, 619 (Mo. 2017) (en banc) (Draper, 
J., dissenting). 
 219. See Manner v. Schiermeier, 393 S.W.3d 58, 66 (Mo. 2013) (en banc); Beshears 
v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 468 S.W.3d 408, 412 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015). 
 220. Craig, 514 S.W.3d at 619 (Draper, J., dissenting). 
 221. Id. at 615 (majority opinion). 
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B. Legislative Action 
Allowing insurers to take offsets from the UIM coverage limits, rather 
than from the total damages, creates risks of insureds being unfairly surprised 
when they do not receive their expected payments under the insurance contract.  
This was the case in Straw in which, under a policy with a UIM coverage limit 
of $100,000, the insurer was able to offset $100,000 and pay the insured noth-
ing, even though the insured suffered $200,000 in damages.222  This left the 
insured with $100,000 in uncompensated damages.  Not only did the insured 
not get what was promised, he did not get anything at all.  Had the offset been 
taken from the total damages rather than the UIM coverage limit, the insured 
would have been compensated for all of his claimed damages. 
The Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision in Craig may lead to a de-
crease in the number of people who purchase UIM insurance.  If consumers 
realize they may not receive the full policy limit even when their uncompen-
sated damages exceed the policy limit, it is likely that fewer people will choose 
to purchase UIM insurance.  Of course, it is also true that, with precedent sup-
porting offset provisions, insurance companies may decrease premiums and 
more people will be willing to purchase the less expensive but narrower UIM 
insurance.  Conversely, had the court reversed and declared another offset pro-
vision invalid, there is a possibility that insurance companies would have re-
sponded by increasing insurance rates and premiums, which could also lead to 
fewer people purchasing insurance. 
Nevertheless, because the interpretation of similar offset provisions has 
been a continuing source of conflict in the courts, it may be better for the leg-
islature to step in.  Missouri’s UM coverage statute and the public policy be-
hind it “produce[] predictability of insurance payouts . . . . along with [an] in-
crease in financial support available should a catastrophic automobile accident 
handicap an insured.”223  This “creates a sustainable balance between turning 
a profit as a business and providing a service genuinely needed by the pub-
lic.”224  However, the same cannot be said for UIM coverage, which is not 
covered by statute.225  Enactment of a more detailed UIM insurance statute in 
Missouri would help courts avoid further conflicts, in addition to helping in-
sureds.  Furthermore, decreased litigation over UIM policies could potentially 
reduce insurance companies’ costs as well as court costs. 
The Missouri legislature should consider enacting an expanded UIM in-
surance statute similar to that enacted in New Mexico, which requires insur-
ance companies to offer UM and UIM insurance.226  The New Mexico statute 
 
 222. See Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Straw, 334 S.W.3d 592, 594 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011). 
 223. Reynolds, supra note 117, at 1082. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-301(West 2018). 
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classifies UIM coverage as a type of UM coverage.227  The New Mexico legis-
lature’s intention in expanding the definition of UM coverage was “to compen-
sate the innocent victims of inadequately insured drivers.”228 
Should the Missouri legislature follow New Mexico’s lead and statutorily 
classify UIM insurance as a type of UM insurance, insurance companies would 
be prohibited from using anti-stacking and offset provisions.229  Missouri’s cur-
rent UM statute allows for policy stacking.230  Therefore, UIM coverage and 
its ability to be stacked would no longer be “determined by the contract entered 
between the insured and the insurer.”231  This would make Missouri an add-on 
jurisdiction where the reasonable expectations of insureds would be better pro-
tected in the event that a tortfeasor’s coverage does not fully reimburse the 
insured’s loss.232  Although insurance companies would likely respond by in-
creasing premiums, those who purchase UIM coverage would be better pro-
tected in addition to having their expectations met. 
This is the coverage the typical insurance purchaser expects when he buys 
UIM insurance.  Furthermore, this approach is more consistent with the pur-
pose of UIM insurance: to “provide additional coverage for those injured by a 
negligent motorist where that motorist’s liability coverage does not fully pay 
for the injured party’s actual damage.”233  Although there is a high probability 
that fewer people will purchase UIM insurance if it becomes more expensive, 
those who purchase it deserve to receive the broad coverage they intend to buy 
rather than to spend their money on what ends up being an inferior policy. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri in Owners Insurance Co. 
v. Craig diverted from a line of Missouri cases that routinely found ambiguity 
in and refused to enforce UIM coverage offsets.  In doing so, the court adhered 
to the plain meaning of the insurance policy but failed to protect the expecta-
tions of the policy holder who had paid for more than he received.  With the 
continuing confusion regarding UIM coverage offsets, it may be time for the 
legislature to step in to prevent the continued occurrence of similar problems. 
 
 227. Id. § 66-5-301(B) (“The uninsured motorist coverage described in Subsection 
A of this section shall include underinsured motorist coverage for persons protected by 
an insured’s policy.”). 
 228. Konnick v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 703 P.2d 889, 891 (N.M. 1985). 
 229. See Ritchie v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 307 S.W.3d 132, 135 (Mo. 2009) 
(en banc). 
 230. MO. REV. STAT. § 379.203 (2016). 
 231. Ritchie, 307 S.W.3d at 135. 
 232. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 64, at 967. 
 233. Bough & Heath, supra note 88, at 210. 
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